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REASSESSING THE AIR FORCE’S SELECTIVE  






The objective of this MBA project is to reassess the Air Force’s current Selective Re-
enlistment Bonus Program and provide a possible alternative for the compensation 
calculation.  To find that alternative method of calculation, the goal of this project was to 
create an experiment using a second priced sealed bid auction.  The experiment would 
provide an insight to truth revealing compensation requests for future job continuation.  
This essential tool will allow the Air Force to begin the determination of how to retain 
vital active duty service members through compensation bonuses while minimizing 
overall personnel costs to the Department of Defense.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE  
According to the National Council of Disability (2009), more than 1.6 million 
American service members have deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan in support of ongoing 
military operations, such as Operation Iraqi Freedom, in response to the terrorist attacks 
on September 11, 2001 (p. 1).  The ability for the Department of Defense to maintain the 
required force levels to continue conducting current operations rests heavily on recruiting 
and retaining service members.  With the constant increases in the timeframe deployed 
and the frequency of deployments, many analysts and policymakers are concerned that 
ongoing operations will have a damaging effect on recruiting and retention and the 
military will fall short of its end strength requirements.   
One of the many ways the Department of Defense is counteracting this potential 
shortfall is through increases and additions in compensation to the service member for 
their undivided loyalty to the U.S. government.  One type of additional compensation, 
and the most costly to the Department of Defense, is in the form of enlistment/Re-
enlistment bonuses.  The intention of these bonuses is to compensate service members in 
specialties that are deemed “critical” within each service department.  There are many 
factors involved, to be discussed in detail in later chapters, when computing the bonus 
amount received by the service member in these critical specialties.  In providing this 
additional compensation, however, military personnel costs may increase significantly 
enough to “crowd out” projected increases in procurement funding for more 
technologically advanced systems needed to maintain superiority.  The Congressional 
Budget Office estimates that military personnel appropriations are likely to increase at an 
average annual rate of about 1.6 percent in real terms between FY 2006 and FY 2024.  
This would increase funding from $113 billion in FY 2006 to some $147 billion by FY 
2024 (2006, p. 19). 
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To maintain a level of readiness required to support the ongoing military 
operations, the Department of Defense is challenged with balancing both recruiting and 
retention issues, the increase in personnel costs and the need for newer weapon systems.  
The purpose of this project focuses on the added costs associated with the retention issues 
currently faced by the Department of Defense, mainly in the Air Force.  It provides the 
Department of Defense an alternative method for calculating the Selective Re-enlistment 
Bonus (SRB) in anticipation that it will help slow the future growth in military personnel 
costs.  The alternative method examined in this project involves a separating auction 
mechanism, which combines a portfolio of two Re-enlistment contracts of different 
lengths with a two-stage auction procedure, which both determines bonus amounts and 
identifies service members to be offered each Re-enlistment bonus.   
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Question  
How might such a separating auction mechanism provide the Air Force with a 
cost effective alternative for calculating Re-enlistment bonuses, while retaining quality 
Air Force military members?   
2. Secondary Questions 
In order to fully address the primary question, several secondary questions will 
have to be answered.  These questions include current issues dealing with retention and 
the current Selective Re-enlistment Bonus Program; compensation currently available to 
military members; potential improvements through different types of auctions and 
asymmetric information analysis; experimental investigation and the feasibility of 
incorporating the results of the experiment into a workable Air Force bonus program.   
C. METHODOLOGY 
This paper builds upon many previous U.S. Naval Postgraduate student theses.  
The foundation was based on, Improving the Navy’s Officer Bonus Program 
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Effectiveness (Filip, 2006) and Using an Experimental Approach to Improving the 
Selective Re-enlistment Bonus Program (Norton, 2007).  In the first report, author 
William N. Filip provides a thorough examination of bonuses used as a valuable tool in 
attracting and retaining naval officers.  Filip uses information gained from current 
policies and research already conducted in the academic arena by combining auction 
theory and signaling theory into a separating auction mechanism that would provide the 
Navy with flexibility, quality and quantity of service members, and cost savings.  In the 
second report, William J. Norton continues with this theory by providing insight on 
alternative compensation methods using an economic experiment that may mirror a 
service member’s response to a retention decision.   
Other documentation was reviewed which provided insight in current military 
operations.  Such information provided a baseline for retention and recruiting issues 
among all branches of the service.  The intent was to view the current situation and 
personnel growth predictions along with previous research on this particular topic and 
decide an alternative method for reducing those growth costs along with increasing 
service member’s attitude toward the military.   
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
This project’s scope focused on enlisted service members in the Air Force.  All 
branches of the service currently have a Selective Re-enlistment Bonus Program; 
however, methods for their calculation vary.  To understand how the Air Force’s program 
works, various articles and literature were reviewed and incorporated into this thesis.  To 
achieve the desired results of this project, a two-stage reverse second priced sealed bid 
auction was created to be conducted for further research.  The auction experiment itself 
creates the limitation on the particular subjects used.   
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II. BACKGROUND—RETENTION  
A. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) RETENTION ISSUES/FACTS  
As stated earlier, the ability to maintain continued presence in the Middle East 
requires the military to rely heavily on recruiting and retaining vital service members.   
Each service branch has its own requirement for end strengths.  For example, the 
Army is currently increasing its recruiting goals for additional personnel levels and 
number of combat brigades.  The basis for this increase focuses on the heightened 
deployment ops tempo.  Unfortunately, in FY 2005, the Army in particular did not meet 
that goal.   
In FY 2006, many of the service branches were successful in meeting their 
recruiting goals, but at the expense of recruit qualifications, as the increased recruiting 
goals transitioned the focus for recruits from quality to quantity to meet the required end 
strengths.  This shift in the quality of recruits is forcing the military to emphasize 
retaining those service members who currently meet the qualifications to perform in 
specialized “critical” jobs, which would take new, recruits years to master.   
Contrary to the Army, the Air Force is undergoing reductions in its end strength 
requirements.  According to the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, it calls for 
“reducing Air Force end strength by approximately 40,000 full-time equivalent personnel 
with balanced cuts across the total force” (p. 47).  The Future Years Defense Program 
matches that objective and outlines, shown in Table 1, a force size of 351,800 personnel 
for 2006 and of 334,200 for 2007, reflecting planned reductions of about 1,900 and 














Table 1.   Plans for the Active Air Force’s End Strength, as Specified in the FYDP 
(After: Congressional Budget Office, 2006).   
According to Maj Gen Frank Faykes, Director, Air Force Budget, a reorganization 
of the force, including phased retirements of some older aircraft systems, is among the 
reasons for the reductions (Faykes, 2006). 
B. AIR FORCE SELECTIVE RE-ENLISTMENT BONUS PROGRAM 
Retention is a big concern for the Air Force.  With the reduction in overall end 
strength, the Air Force still faces the challenges of retaining personnel with special skills 
in high demand.  The following table illustrates the shortfalls faced by the Air Force’s 
retention goals during the fiscal years 2000–2005.  While retention may be less 
problematic in 2009 and 2010 under the current economic conditions, retention problems 





      Initial Enlistments      Midcareer Personnel Careerists
Fiscal 
Year Actual Goal 
Attainment 
of Goal Actual Goal 
Attainment 
of Goal Actual Goal 
Attainment 
of Goal
2000 53.1 55.0 No 69.7 75.0 No 90.8 95.0 No
2001 56.1 55.0 Yes 68.9 75.0 No 90.2 95.0 No
2002 72.1 55.0 Yes 78.3 75.0 Yes 94.6 95.0 No
2003 60.5 55.0 Yes 72.9 79.0 No 95.2 95.0 Yes
2004 63.0 55.0 Yes 70.0 75.0 No 97.0 95.0 Yes
2005 39.0 52.0 No 67.0 69.0 No 85.0 85.0 Yes  
Table 2.   The Active Air Force’s Retention of Enlisted Personnel (After:  
Congressional Budget Office, 2006).   
Enlisted personnel are organized in career zones.  Zone A includes first-term, or 
initial enlistments, which involve airmen with less than six years of service; Zone B 
includes mid-career airmen between 6–10 years of service; and Zone C includes career 
airmen, careerists, between 10–14 years of service.  As shown in the table above, the Air 
Force faces its greatest challenge in meeting its retention goal for mid career personnel.  
During the same time period, it met its retention goal for careerists half of the time and 
initial enlistments most of the time.   
Many factors affect Air Force retention levels.  Two such factors deal with the 
conditions of the current labor market and overall popularity of current military 
operations.  A large segment of Air Force personnel are trained in aircraft and aviation 
skills, two highly demanded “critical” fields.  These skills are very valuable and easily 
transferable to the private sector.  When labor market conditions are favorable and 
unemployment is low, the Air Force risks losing those valuable assets to private 
companies willing to pay top dollar for those skills.  On the same line, if the overall 
population’s attitude toward current military operations becomes strained, many service 
members will feel pressured to separate in support of American’s viewpoint.   
In a time of end-strength reduction, there are different retention incentive tools 
available to all service branches to help retain personnel with highly demanded special 
skills, even while releasing other personnel.  One such program is the Selective Re-
enlistment Bonus Program, or SRB Program; a management tool designed to increase or 
maintain enlisted retention in critically manned specialties.  Established by Congress in 
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1974, the SRB Program, currently targeting enlisted personnel, is the primary tool used 
for addressing the short-term retention problems faced by today’s military.  For FY 2009, 
this incentive allows the military to pay bonuses up to $90,000 per enlistment to entice 
enlisted service members to Re-enlist for another term.  The bonus amounts paid by the 
Air Force depend mainly on its needs for personnel in critical specialties and the length 
of the Re-enlistment.  According to the Congressional Budget Office (2006):  
Between 2000 and 2005, the Air Force’s Selective Re-enlistment Bonus 
Program budget reached its highest levels in 2002 at $232 million, 2003 at 
$247 million, and 2004 at $263 million; in those years, it met its retentions 
goals in more of the experience categories (initial enlistments, mid career, 
careerist) than during the other years of the period.  Decreasing SRB 
expenditures to $238 million in 2005 coincided with the Air Force’s not 
meeting its retention goals in two of the three experience categories.  For 
2006 and 2007, the Air Force budgeted lower amounts, about $214 million 
and $195 million, respectively, presumably because of its planned end-
strength reductions. (pp. 70–71) 
C. AIR FORCE SELECTIVE RE-ENLISTMENT BONUS 
The SRB is cash compensation designed to retain existing personnel in critical 
specialties, while attempting to entice other personnel from less critical specialties to 
retrain into critical specialties.  Bonuses are offered by zones, A B and C as listed above, 
and within an Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC), thereby allowing targeted retention 
effects in the specific year groups.  
In 1998, the Air Force designated 107 AFSCs as eligible to receive the SRB.  By 
2002, the number of AFSCs receiving the bonus increased to one hundred sixty-one.  
This responded to the end strength shortfalls in 1999 and 2000 and the Stop Loss 
program implementation after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.  By March 
2005, the Air Force experienced higher than expected retention and exceeded its end 
strength requirements, which significantly decreased the number of eligible AFSCs to 
sixty-three.  In 2006, the Air Force offered bonuses to 37 AFSCs.  The following figure 
outlines those 37 AFSCs. 
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Air Force Specialty Code Title 
1A0X1 In-Flight Refueling 
1A1X1X Flight Engineer 
1A2X1 Aircraft Loadmaster 
1A3X1 Airborne Mission Sys 
1A4X1X Airborne Battle Mgt Sys 
1A7X1 Aerial Gunner 
1A8X1X Airborne Crypto Linguist 
1C1X1 Air Traffic Control 
1C2X1 Combat Control 
1C4X1 Tactical Air Comd&Cnt 
1C5X1D Aero Con/Warn Sys 
1C6X1 Space Sys Operations 
1N0X1 Operations Intel 
1N1X1 Imagery Analysis 
1N2X1 Comm Signals Intelligence 
1N3X2A Romance Crypto Lingst 
1N3X3A/D Slavic Crypto Lingst 
1N3X4A Chinese Crypto Lingst 
1N3X4G Korean Crypto Lingst 
1N3X5X Mid East Crypto Lingst 
1N3X6X African Crypto Lingst 
1N3X7X Turkic Crypto Lingst 
1N3X8X Polynesian Crypto Lingst 
1N3X9X Indo-Iranian Crypto Lngst 
1N4X1 Network Intelligence Analys 
1N5X1 Elect Signals Intel Exploit 
1T0X1 Surv, Evas, Res, Escape 
1T2X1 Pararescue 
1W0X1 Weather 
2G0X1 Logistics Plans 
2T1X1 Vehicle Operations 
3E8X1 Explosive Ord Dispos 
3E9X1 Readiness 
3P0X1A/B Sf Mil Work Dog/Cmbt Arms 
4J0X2 Physical Medicine 
7S0X1 Special Investigation 
9L0X0 Interpreter/Translator 
Figure 1.   Air Force’s SRB Eligible Air Force Specialty Codes 
Eligibility to receive an SRB requires the enlisted service member to be coded 
with one of the above AFSCs at their date of re-enlistment and that the service member 
 10
re-enlist for a minimum of two years, or up to a maximum of six years.  Payment is 
received at 50 percent of the SRB value on their date of re-enlistment, with the remaining 
amount paid in equal installments over the re-enlistment years in service.   
The monetary value of the SRB is calculated by the following equation: 
 
SRB Amount = Monthly Basic Pay * Years of Re-enlistment * SRB Multiple 
 
The monthly basic pay is based on the service member’s rank/grade and time in service; 
the years of re-enlistment are the number of years the service member will remain on 
active duty, a minimum of two and a maximum of six; and the SRB multiple is offered in 
multiples of 0.5, ranging from 0.0 through 7.0 with higher multiples receiving larger 
monetary payments.  The SRB multiplier determines the SRB value by allocating the 
authorized budget to those AFSCs eligible through an optimization model.  This model is 
based on eligible AFSCs, retention shortfalls in those AFSCs, total budget costs, and 
constraints on increases in retention.   
D. SELECTIVE RE-ENLISTMENT BONUS PROGRAM CONCERNS 
While the current optimization model used by the Air Force can be modified 
according to the Air Force’s retention needs, two problems exist.  First, the optimization 
model focuses only on specific AFSCs and zones based on the needs of the Air Force 
within a given budget constraint.  Holding years of re-enlistment constant, the SRB 
multiple identifies the severity of the re-enlistment problem within the specific AFSC and 
zone along with the level of pay authorized to deal with that problem.  All service 
members within the same AFSC and zone level are compensated equally.  Because the 
SRB and retention are interrelated when the optimization model sets the price too high, 
the Air Force exceeds its retention requirement within the specific AFSC; more eligible 
service members re-enlist to collect the bonus.  The opposite is true, when the model sets 




separate.  The mission is to find the “right price” to retain the “right amount of people.” 
To alleviate this fluctuation, the Air Force needs to find a way to set the SRB price 
correctly to retain the desired number of service members.  
The second problem with the current optimization model focuses on the actual 
fixed price paid to all service members even though many members would have re-
enlisted for a much smaller SRB amount, resulting service members capturing surplus 
value or “profits.”   
Ideally, the Air Force should avoid overpaying such service members and instead 
use those funds to pay higher SRBs to more qualified service member or other critical 
AFSCs to maintain a level of manning within those career fields.  To retain more 
qualified service members the Air Force needs to place more importance on both sides of 
the labor market when determining SRB compensation prices and desired quality service 
members.   
To address these problems, this research will take the current one-sided 
optimization mechanism and draw on both Auction Theory, in which the Air Force uses 
an auction to correctly set the marginal SRB price, and Signaling Theory, in which 
service members signal their re-enlistment intentions to the Air Force through a second 
round of auctions.  The sequential auctions should set the marginal SRB at the level 
required to retain the desired number of service members, but re-enlist service members 
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III. ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PAY ENTITLEMENTS  
To begin the discussion of retention compensation, it is important to first identify 
the different types of pay and allowances that military members receive.  These 
entitlements are based on many different factors such as rank, dependent status, longevity 
and other special circumstances. 
A. MILITARY PAY  
Military compensation in the form of pay is the most tangible, immediate benefit 
of military service.  There are three categories of military pay: basic pay, special pay, and 
incentive pay.  All active duty enlisted members receive basic pay, however, special and 
incentive pays are only available to members performing specific duties or in specific 
duty locations.  Military pay is also referred to as regular military compensation (RMC).  
Regular military compensation accounts for about 44 percent of total military 
compensation for the average active duty service member (Kosiak, 2006). 
1. Basic Pay 
Basic pay is the fundamental component of military pay.  All service members 
receive it and typically, it is the largest component of a service member’s military pay.  
Grade and longevity, or years of credible service, determines the amount of basic pay 
received.  Wages are set not only to entice service members to promote to higher ranks, 
but also compensate for experience accrued through service time (longevity).  For FY 
2009, the monthly basic pay range from $1399.50 for E-1s to $6863.10 for E-9s.  
Annual pay raises vary by fiscal year.  For FY 2009, the President signed the 
Fiscal Year 2009 National Defense Authorization Act, which authorizes a 3.9 percent pay 
raise for all service members (DFAS).   
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2. Special Pay 
Special pays are compensation to service members who perform specific duties 
and/or at specific locations.  Compensation for more than one Special Pay is authorized 
and in addition to other pay and allowances.  The following are just a few categories of 
Special Pay an enlisted service member may receive. 
a.   Special Duty Assignment Pay 
Compensation paid to enlisted service members when performing duties 
designated by the Secretary of the Air Force as extremely difficult or involving an 
unusual degree of responsibility.   
b. Enlistment and Re-enlistment Bonuses  
The Air Force uses enlistment bonuses to attract new recruits into critical 
job specialties currently experiencing shortages for various reasons, including high 
qualification standards, unattractiveness of the job itself, and/ or the need for additional 
manning in a specific specialty.  In exchange for a specified monetary bonus, new 
recruits are required to enlist for a period of at least two years.   
Re-enlistment bonuses, as described in further detail above, are used to 
encourage service members already in an active status to re-enlist into critical specialties 
experiencing shortages.  The monetary compensation for re-enlistment bonuses is based 
on experience zones, as stated above.   
c. Hostile Fire or Imminent Danger Pay 
Hostile Fire Pay is offered when a service member is subjected to hostile 
fire or explosion of a hostile mine, on official duty in close proximity to a hostile fire 
incident, or is killed, injured, or wounded by hostile fire, explosion of a hostile mine, or 
any other hostile action.  Imminent Danger Pay is provided when a service member is on 
official duty in a designated Imminent Danger Pay area. 
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d.   Hardship Duty Pay 
Hardship Duty Pay is awarded to service members while performing duty 
designated by the Secretary of Defense as hardship duty. The Secretary of Defense has 
directed that Hardship Duty Pay shall be provided to service members for performing a 
designated hardship mission, when assigned to a designated location and/or when serving 
on a designated involuntary extension of duty. 
e. Overseas Extended Tour of Duty 
Monetary compensation is given to service members who are in specialties 
and at a location designated by the Secretary of the Air Force for the purposes of this 
entitlement, have completed an overseas tour of duty, and have extended the tour of duty 
for a period of at least one year. 
3. Incentive Pay 
In addition to both Basic pay and Special pay, service members may also be 
entitled to one or more of the following Incentive pays.   
a. Aerial Flight Pay 
Aerial Flight Pay, also known as Hazardous Duty Incentive Pay for Flying 
Duty, is awarded to service members in flying status who are on competent orders 
participating in regular and frequent aerial flights as crew or non-crew members.   
b. Hazardous Duty Incentive Pay for Other Than Aerial Flights 
Service members required to perform certain duties designated as 
hazardous, other than aerial flight, are entitled to receive this incentive pay.  Those duties 
include parachute duty, flight deck duty, demolition duty, experimental stress duty, toxic 




Allowances are the second most important element of military pay entitlements.  
Allowances are provided for specific needs, such as food or housing.  Monetary 
allowances are paid when the government does not provide for that specific need.  The 
following are different types of allowances.   
1. Basic Allowance for Subsistence  
Subsistence allowance provides a monetary benefit to offset the cost of meals, 
when meals are not provided by the government.  The amount of subsistence is based 
upon the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) food cost index, which is adjusted 
annually and is identical for all enlisted service members.   
2. Basic Allowance for Housing 
Basic Allowance for Housing provides service members monetary compensation 
in lieu of quarters (housing).  The allowance is based on geographic duty location, pay 
grade, and dependency status and is intended to represent accurate and equitable housing 
compensation based on housing costs in local civilian housing markets.  Allowance rates 
are subject to cost increase and decrease in conjunction with the local rental housing 
market.   
3. Family Separation  
Family Separation comes in two forms. 
a. Family Separation Allowance  
Payable to service members with dependents or married to another service 
member for an enforced separation due to competent orders requiring permanent duty at a 
dependent restricted overseas tour or a temporary duty assignment for more than 30 days. 
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b. Family Separation Housing 
Payable to service members for the additional housing expenses when 
assigned to a dependent restricted overseas tour and not assigned to adequate government 
quarters.   
4. Clothing Monetary Allowance 
By law and under Presidential Executive Order, enlisted service members are 
either furnished clothing or provided a monetary allowance to purchase such clothing on 
an annual basis.  There are three basic types of clothing allowances:  Initial clothing 
allowance issued to enlisted service members upon initial enlistment into the service; 
cash clothing replacement allowance provided to enlisted service members annually for 
replacement cost of required clothing items; and extra clothing allowance provided for 
unusual circumstances when a service member requires additional uniform items such as 
civilian clothing, to perform assigned duties.   
5. Contiguous United States (CONUS) Cost of Living Allowance 
(COLA) 
CONUS COLA is paid to service members as compensation for a portion of 
excess costs for non-housing expenses incurred in high cost areas.  Qualification for this 
compensation is based on geographic duty location, mainly in major metropolitan areas 
and installations within CONUS.   
6. Station Allowances 
In some OCONUS areas, the average cost of housing and food are substantially 
higher than what is considered normal. To compensate for the higher costs, the service 
member may be authorized to receive one or more station allowances. They include the 
following. 
 18
a. Temporary Lodging Allowance  
Authorized to partially reimburse a service member for both excess 
expenses while occupying temporary lodging and expenses for meals while using 
temporary lodging. 
b. Cost of Living Allowance  
Payable to assist service members in defraying the excess costs of goods 
and services incurred in high cost areas overseas. 
c. Overseas Housing Allowance 
Payable to service members for excess housing costs incurred. 
d. Move-In Housing Allowance 
An up front, one lump sum payment given to service members authorized 
OHA at an OCONUS Permanent Duty Station to cover average move-in costs. 
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IV. CURRENT RETENTION MECHANISM  
A. THE SRB SELECTION PROCESS 
The following information largely draws on Air Force Instruction: AFI 36-2606, 
21 Nov 2001.   
1. SRB Program 
The SRB program is a financial incentive program paid to eligible enlisted service 
members to entice re-enlistments, or cross-training into undermanned critical AFSCs.  
The objective is to retain those service members who consistently demonstrate the 
capability to maintain high professional standards.   
The authority to add or delete SRB candidate AFSCs belongs to the office of HQ 
Air Force DPRS (personnel/manpower); however, inputs are taken from the larger “in the 
field” groups, to include commanders, supervisors, Major Command staff, Air Force 
Personnel Center (AFPC) assignments teams, functional career managers, manpower 
experts, and Air Staff offices.   
The SRB is available in specific AFSCs and zones and only one SRB is 
authorized per eligible service member.  According to AFPC, the maximum SRB 
effective November 2009 is payable at $90,000 per zone.1   
2. Eligibility Criteria 
The SRB program is available to all enlisted service members, but only those re-
enlistment-eligible (within the specified AFSC and zone level) will receive SRB 
consideration or reconsideration if previously ineligible due to time in service or because 
their AFSC was not previously offered for that particular rank.  Unit commanders have 
total control on which eligible service members within their organizations will receive the 
                                                 
1 The AFI publication has not been updated.  The current amount was located at 
http://ask.afpc.randolph.af.mil/main_content.asp?prods1=1&prods2=2&prods3=2535&prods4=2537. 
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SRB payout by considering the service member’s basic military standards, reviewing the 
Unfavorable Information File (UIF), if applicable, and evaluating duty performance and 
leadership abilities, normally observed through the service member’s Enlisted 
Performance Reports (EPRs).  Those re-enlistment-eligible enlisted service members that 
are non-selected by their unit commanders are not eligible for promotion and any 
projected line numbers will automatically be cancelled.  In this situation, the service 
member will remain on active duty until such time as their enlistment commitment 
expires and will then be separated from the Air Force.   
B. THE CURRENT MECHANISM  
The current SRB optimization model is based on an equation that hones in on 
SRB payouts for undermanned critical AFSCs.  The desired outcome is to pay the right 
compensation to retain enough service members to fulfill the required end strength for all 
Air Force career fields.  The downfall of the current mechanism is that it is one-sided; 
essentially ignoring the Air Force’s preferences over which service members to retain, 
beyond those not selected by their unit commanders, by offering all service members 
(regardless of quality) within each identified AFSC and zone level a single SRB payout 
amount.  
The Air Force does recognize that there are variations among service member’s 
willingness to re-enlist, as reflected by the service member’s willingness to accept or the 
price a service member requires to re-enlist, but cannot reflect those preferences with the 
current mechanism.  Therefore, it chooses to engage in its own price game--find the price 
that will retain the required number of service members to meet end strengths, or the 
“cheapest to retain.”  Later in this thesis, an alternative two-sided mechanism concept 
will be introduced that emphasizes preferences on both sides of the labor market, the Air 
Force and the service member.  But first let’s focus on the basics.   
1. Basic Skill Combinations 
There are two alternatives to a service member who is considering re-enlistment: 
remaining on active duty or leaving the military for a civilian job.  Suppose there are two 
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kinds of skills (1) military-specific skills (e.g., flying aircraft, loading pallets into aircraft, 
disarming IEDs, etc.) and (2) general skills (e.g., managerial ability, accounting skills, 
etc.). Figure 2 provides a graphical view of potential skill combinations. 
 
 
Figure 2.   Skill Combinations 
Ideally, the Air Force would like to retain service members who possess high 
levels of both skills (upper-right quadrant of Figure 2).  These service members would be 
considered of the “highest quality.”  However, because they have high general skills, 
those service members are more likely to succeed in a civilian (non-military) job, and are 
generally less likely (willing) to re-enlist without higher compensation (willingness to 
accept) to remain on active duty; the minimum re-enlistment bonus they would be willing 
to accept would likely be higher than that required by service members with high 
military-specific skills and low general skills.  
Not Offered SRB 
More Willing to 
Re-enlist 
Less Willing to 
Re-enlist 
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On the other hand, those service members who possess lower levels of each skill 
(lower-left quadrant of Figure 2) are less desirable to both the Air Force and the civilian 
sector and would be willing to accept a very small or no bonus to re-enlist.  These service 
members would be considered of the “lowest quality.”  It is important to note there are 
basic standards that have to be met for a service member to remain on active duty.  Those 
that do not meet those basic standards will be separated; not retained on active duty or 
receive the SRB (lower quadrant of Figure 2).   
2. Meeting Retention Goals 
As noted above, the current retention mechanism adapts a cost-effective one-sided 
concept; it motivates the following graph (Figure 3).   
 
 










This graph illustrates the difference in service members’ SRB requirements to 
remain on active duty with the lower SRB payments corresponding to those most willing 
to re-enlist (high military specific skills, low general skills).  The shaded area represents 
the cost to the Air Force to retain a specified number of service members at a constant 
SRB payment to all service members.   
The Air Force’s goal is to calculate the “right price” to induce a predetermined 
number of service members (end strength) to voluntarily re-enlist while keeping the 
integrity of an approved budget ceiling, as shown above.  The “right price” for the “right 
number of people” is then determined and a single SRB is offered to the specified AFSC 
and zone level.   
This mechanism only focuses on those service members “more willing to serve” 
or “cheapest to retain;” those with higher military-specific skills, lower general skills, 
(upper left quadrant of Figure 2) or those less desirable service members with the lowest 
quality.  It generally fails to capture those higher valued, more expensive, service 
members whose required SRB is above the SRB offered. In other words, the outcome 
does not retain or discriminate based on quality, but only on cost effectiveness.   
3.  The Right Price for the Right Amount of People 
Because service members have different SRB requirements to stay in the military, 
the current mechanism makes it difficult, if not impossible, to determine the precise SRB 
required to retain the precise number of service members desired.  It becomes a 
mathematical/statistical guessing game creating the potential to significantly overshoot 
(surplus) or undershoot (deficit) both the targeted end strength and SRB paid (see Figure 
4).  Both outcomes inevitably lead to additional costs to reach the Air Force’s desired end 
strength, along with the challenge of recalculating the required SRB to meet the desired 
end strength target.  Additionally, the Air Force has little to no flexibility if corrections 
are needed.  Adjustments to retention goals and SRB payouts are normally calculated 
using historical data on an annual basis. 
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Figure 4.   Resulting SRB Deficits and Surpluses  
a. Deficit 
If the outcome of the current mechanism creates an end strength deficit, 
the SRB was set too low and not enough service members voluntarily re-enlisted; 
therefore, the Air force failed to reach its re-enlistment target.  The Air Force then faces 
shortages in those career fields deemed critical.  Additional service members would still 
be needed to meet the target, creating the need for a higher SRB payout and/or non-
voluntarily cross-training service members from other non-critical career fields; both 
significant costs to the Air Force.  Again, despite the re-enlistment deficit, the single SRB 
offered to all service members may be significantly higher than most of the retained 
service member’s willingness to re-enlist, representing an SRB overpayment to those 
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b. Surplus 
If the outcome creates an end strength surplus, two issues emerge.  First, 
the Air Force retains too many service members in that AFSC, leading to one of two 
options--non-voluntary separation or cross-training the overage.  Associated costs include 
some type of separation compensation or additional qualification training costs to learn a 
new trade, respectively.  Second, because the outcome overshot the required SRB, the 
excess SRB paid to each service member is an additional cost to the Air Force, well 
above the amount each service member may have required to re-enlist.  In other words, 
even when the targeted end strengths are precisely achieved, service members with a 
relatively low willingness to accept receive an SRB exceeding their required SRB.  If the 
SRB is set too high, each service member receives even higher compensation.  This 
outcome creates an unnecessary overpayment to service members willing to retain at a 
lower required SRB.   
C. FINDINGS 
The Air Force’s current retention mechanism has the propensity to hire the least 
cost, low quality service members.  This mechanism does not retain or discriminate based 
on quality (assuming certain service members are above the minimum required quality), 
only cost-effectiveness.  Furthermore, it is difficult, at best, to determine the precise SRB 
that will retain the targeted end strength.  With the ever changing focus on economic and 
national security conditions, the military needs to have the flexibility to quickly adjust to 
those changes, in terms of targeted end strength and SRB required to meet that end 
strength.  Another important factor is the quality of its service members.  While it is 
difficult to maintain a specific quantity of service members, it is more difficult to capture 
the right quality service members using the current optimization mechanism.  In the next 
chapters, this thesis will introduce the concept of an alternative method to better capture 
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V. AUCTION AND SIGNALING THEORIES 
While the Air Force desires high quality service members, setting the SRB too 
high may satisfy the Air Force’s quantity and quality needs but overpays service 
members for their re-enlistment.  In turn, setting the SRB amount too low will almost 
guarantee that all service members with higher general skills, including those with high 
military-specific skills, will not re-enlist but seek employment in the civilian sector.  
Using the current optimization model does not solve this problem, begging the question 
of whether an alternative mechanism using both auction and signaling theories can 
establish an appropriate bonus level. 
Many U.S. Naval Postgraduate School students have conducted research on 
auctions, signaling/matching theory, and the combination of both theories for many of the 
DoD’s military programs; from the U.S. Navy’s Assignment Incentive Program (AIP) 
(Tan, 2006) and Officer Bonus Program (Filip, 2006) to the retention issues in the Marine 
Corps (Bock, 2007) and even the Australian Army (Cook, 2008).  The outcome, though 
varied depending on program and methods used, has proven that using auction 
mechanisms verses traditional one-size fits-all SRB methods has proven positive in not 
only saving potential DoD dollars, but building a stronger foundation for continued 
research in putting the right people (quality) into the right jobs (quantity).  To enable 
further discussions and future research on alternative mechanisms, this chapter will 
combine and reiterate the basics of auctions and signaling theory from those theses.   
A. AUCTIONS 
Auctions are based on a number of different factors; from the number of people 
bidding on goods, to the seller’s end strategy on which auction will provide the biggest 
profit.  Auctions have a basic vocabulary that remains constant regardless of auction 
types, rules, or outcome.  Figure 5 illustrates the basic foundation for all auction types 
(Filip, 2006).   
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Figure 5.   Auction Vocabulary as it Applies to Forward and Reverse Auctions 
1. Participants 
In each auction, there are bidders who compete with one another to achieve the 
winning price and bid-takers who receive the proposed offers from the bidders.  In other 
words each auction has a seller who provides a good or service for a price and a buyer 
who wants that good or service and will pay the end price to the seller.  Depending on 
whether the seller(s) or buyer(s) are the bid-taker or bidders determines which type of 
auction is used (forward or reverse).   
2. Valuation  
The value of an auctioned item and the means of expressing that value are 
important pieces in all auction designs.   
a. Common Value Versus Independent-Private Value Auctions 
In common value auctions, it is assumed that the value of the item being 
auctioned is essentially the same to every bidder, but that their estimates of this unknown 
value vary.  In other words, the true value of an item is unknown until purchased; 
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therefore, each bidder places the same value on that item and adjusts his or her bid based 
on the bids of the other bidders assuming other bidders have more or less information 
about the item.   
For independent-private value auctions, bidders have unique valuations for 
the item in question, which is unknown to other bidders; each participant will bid to 
exactly their own value for the object.  The value of the item is not only different among 
the bidders, but the value placed by each bidder does not affect the value the other 
bidders place on that item.   
b. Reservation Price and Reserve Price 
In a forward auction, the reservation price is the maximum amount a buyer 
(bidder) is willing to pay for an item; in a reverse auction, it is the minimum amount a 
seller (bidder) would accept for an item.   
The reserve price in a forward auction is the minimum a seller (bid-taker) 
is willing to accept for an item; in a reverse auction, it is the maximum a buyer (bid-
taker) is willing to pay for an item.   
3. Forward Versus Reverse Auctions 
a. Forward Auctions  
Forward auctions are the most commonly known auctions and involve a 
single seller, also known as a bid-taker, who puts a good or service up for sale to multiple 
buyers or bidders.  As buyers increase their bids, it increases their chances of winning the 
auction, but decreases their surplus value (profit) if they win.  The bidder who provides 
the highest bid wins the auction; the price they pay depends on other characteristics of the 
auction design (described below). 
b. Reverse Auctions 
In contrast, a reverse auction has a single buyer (bid-taker) and multiple 
sellers (bidders) who compete for the right to provide the item up for sale.  As sellers 
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decrease their bids, it increases their chance of winning the auction, but decreases their 
surplus value (profits) if they win.  The seller with the lowest bid wins the auction; the 
price they receive depends on other characteristics of the auction (described below).   
4. First-Price verses Second-Price  
a. First-Price Auction 
In a first-price forward (reverse) auction, the winning bidder pays 
(receives) the highest (lowest) bid submitted; this is the price of the winning bid.   
b. Second-Price Auction 
In a second-priced forward (reverse) auction, the winning bidder pays 
(receives) the second highest (lowest) bid submitted; this is the first excluded bid.   
5. Open Versus Sealed-Bid 
An open auction is one where the actual bids are announced openly for all 
participants to observe.  Mediums include auctioneers, the bidders themselves, or 
electronic means.  This allows bidders to strategize based on other bids.  Conversely, 
sealed-bid auctions are those auctions where bids are unknown to each competing bidder 
when submitted and all bids are revealed simultaneously.   
6.  Types of Auctions 
a.  English Auction 
An English auction is the most commonly applied and recognized type of 
auction; it is an open-bid, first-price auction.  If there are many buyers and one seller, it is 
an ascending-bid auction where the offered price is successively raised until reaching a 
price that only one bidder is willing to pay; the high bidder wins the item for sale and 
pays the winning bid.   
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b.  Dutch Auction 
A Dutch auction is the opposite of an English auction.  It is a descending-
bid action where an auctioneer announces a high initial price, which is successively 
lowered until some bidder announces his or her willingness to purchase the good or 
service at that price; the first bidder to express their willingness to pay the current price 
wins the item for sale and pays that price.  As with English auctions, all bidders are aware 
of the current price for the item during the auction.   
c.  First-Price Sealed-Bid  
In a first-price sealed-bid (FPSB) auction, bidders submit sealed bids 
which are unknown to other bidders.  When there are many buyers and one seller (many 
sellers and one buyer), the highest (lowest) bidder wins the auction and pays (receives) 
the amount of his or her bid.  With many buyers, the winning buyer will typically bid 
below his willingness to pay for the item in order to receive some surplus value; with 
many sellers, the winning bidder will need to bid above his minimum acceptable price, or 
willingness to accept, in order to receive a surplus.   
To optimally balance the desire to maximize the chances of winning 
against the desire to maximize the surplus if he or she does win, the bidder tries to predict 
what others are likely to bid for the good or service; in particular, the price of the first 
excluded bidder.  In a FPSB auction, “the bidder bids some amount less than his true 
valuation [with many buyers and one seller]: exactly how much less depends upon the 
probability distribution of the other bidders’ valuations and the number of competing 
bidders” (McAfee& McMillan, 1987).  The opposite is true for an auction with many 
sellers; bidders will bid above their true valuation based on expectations of how others 
may bid. 
d.  Second-Price Sealed Bid  
Second price sealed bid (SPSB) auctions resemble FBSB auctions in that 
bids are sealed and unknown to other bidders and, moreover, the highest bidder wins with 
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many buyers and the lowest bidder wins with many sellers.  However, the winning bidder 
pays an amount equal to the first unsuccessful bid in the SPSB auction; the second 
highest bid with many buyers and the second lowest bid with many sellers.  More 
generally, the price the winner (or winners) of an SPSB auction pays or receives is equal 
to the first excluded bid. 
Note that an individual’s bid in a SPSB auction determines whether he or 
she is the winner, but does not determine the amount paid/to be paid, which instead 
depends only on the bids of others.  As a result (and after some analysis), it is easily 
shown that placing a bid that reflects one’s true valuation is in the bidder’s own best 
interest in any SPSB auction; this makes this auction both efficient and truth-revealing.   
Now that the four types of auctions have been described, the question to 
the Air Force is which auction would use the SRB budget cost-effectively?   
B. REVENUE EQUIVALENCE THEOREM  
The answer to the above question is that “any” of the four auctions can be used to 
find the optimal price but they all involve the same cost to the Air Force, on average, 
according to the revenue equivalence theorem, which is an important finding in auction 
theory.  The revenue equivalence theorem assumes all bidders are risk neutral and have 
their own independent values for the auctioned item (e.g., they all have independent 
valuations of the SRB they require to re-enlist).  A buyer’s valuation of a good or service 
is sometimes referred to as his or her willingness-to-pay while a seller’s valuation of a 
good or service is sometimes referred to as his or her willingness-to-accept (WTA).  If 
bidders are risk neutral and have independent valuations, the revenue equivalence 
theorem states that all four types of auction mechanism will be “revenue equivalent,” 
resulting in the same expected cost (revenue), providing the item always goes to the 
highest (lowest) bidder.  
Assuming revenue equivalence, auctions would allow the Air Force to set the 
SRB price correctly, but would not capture any of the surplus value captured by the 
service members more willing to re-enlist.  Using a traditional auction to set the SRB for 
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specified AFSCs only solves one of the two problems discussed above.  Using any of the 
four auctions would allow the Air Force to set the correct price for the SRB, but does not 
improve cost efficiency.  To address cost efficiency, a more unique bidding auction 
strategy must be presented; one that captures at least some of the service members’ 
surplus value through some mechanism that signals which service members are more 
willing to re-enlist.  The next chapter will focus on signaling theory.   
C. ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 
As stated previously, auctions can be a vital force shaping tool used to retain the 
right number of service members and set the bonus required to retain those service 
members to satisfy end strength requirements; however, using auctions alone still does 
not resolve the issue of cost effectiveness; the Air Force is unable to determine who it is 
most cost effective to retain.   
1. Background 
In many life transactions, the people involved have different information and in 
many situations one side of the interaction knows something that the other does not; this 
is known as asymmetric information.  In market situations, potential buyers maybe 
unaware of the true value of the transaction or what other buyers are willing to pay; 
whereas the seller is fully aware of the item’s characteristics, but not what the buyers are 
willing to pay.  In many instances, the participants are aware that information is being 
withheld; in other instances, the unknown information might not be as obvious. 
There are two broad types of asymmetric information that buyers and sellers 
might lack but desire; hidden characteristics and hidden actions.   
a. Hidden Characteristics 
Hidden characteristics are information that one side of the transaction 




when buying a used car, the seller has a much better idea of the car’s quality than the 
buyer and may withhold unfavorable information about the car.  In most cases, the seller 
will know more about the item being sold than the buyer.  
There are, however, situations in which the buyer is the better informed 
party.  Take the life insurance market for example, buyers have a better idea concerning 
their health and family history than the insurance company selling the policy.  In both 
situations, there is hidden characteristics that the uninformed party desires, but may not 
know.   
b. Hidden Actions 
The second type of asymmetric information occurs when one side of the 
transaction takes an action that the other side cannot observe, but affects them directly.  
In the labor market, for example, firms focus on hiring potential employees who will 
produce high quality work and remain professional.  What the employee does during the 
work day may not be observable at all times and actions, such as shirking, may occur.  In 
this situation, there are actions in which one party may participate that the uninformed 
party may not recognize, but desire to know.   
2. Competitive Market Signaling 
One way to reduce the affects of hidden characteristics and actions is finding 
certain indicators that provide the uninformed party insight into the informed party’s 
motivation.  This is called signaling.  
To understand the phenomenon of signaling, it is helpful to note the difference 
between asymmetric and symmetric information using a labor market example.  Suppose 
workers’ ability is easily observable to the workers and their employers.  Given this 
symmetrical information and a perfectly competitive market, all workers hired could be 
paid based on their observable ability; lower-ability workers could be paid a lower wage 
and higher-ability workers could be paid a high wage.   
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With asymmetrical information, a potential worker’s ability is not easily 
observable.  She may know her ability to perform the required duties, but the firm has no 
way of determining whether she is of high- or low-ability at the time of hiring.  When 
hiring a worker under this situation, a firm faces a chance that the worker is of either 
high- or low-ability.  This becomes the main concern for firms when these positions are 
highly competitive and the firm’s ultimate goal is to hire high-ability workers.  Without 
additional information identifying the higher-ability workers, those individuals face the 
risk of losing competitive positions to lower-ability workers.   
To combat this issue, high-ability workers must send a signal that low-ability 
workers find it difficult or impossible to send.  So how can firms better judge potential 
workers?  Michael Spence in Market Signaling: Informational Transfer in Hiring and 
Related Screening Processes (1974) makes the inference that going to school may be a 
relevant signal in labor markets.   
The cost of secondary education includes both monetary costs, such as tuition, 
and non-monetary costs, such as effort.  If work ability and ability in school are closely 
related, then attending school may be costlier for low-ability individuals who find it more 
of a struggle and have to study harder.  Therefore, low-ability workers would need 
greater compensation to complete secondary education in relation to high-ability workers, 
making their investment for secondary education exceed their benefits; low-ability 
workers will choose not to attend college and accept lower paying employment.  Even 
though education does not enhance ability, it does signal ability, and workers may use 
education to distinguish themselves from one another.   
There is considerable evidence that using education as a signaling model is widely 
popular.  Corporate America has come to rely on the college degree as the safest 
guarantee that an applicant has the skills, discipline and maturity to tackle the job 
(Uchitelle, 1990). 
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D. APPLICATION TO THE AIR FORCE 
In the case of retention (recruitment), both the Air Force and service member 
(recruit) have information that is useful to the other party.  The Air Force is better 
informed about the extent of the military’s end strength requirements and has insight into 
the ability to retain (recruit) a given quantity of service members.  Service members 
(recruits) gain this insight by observing the fluctuating trends of the eligible AFSCs and 
SRB levels (end strength fluctuations or increased budgets identified to increase 
recruitment goals).  A pattern of rising bonus levels, end strength increases, or AFSCs 
authorized to receive the bonus, could signal a period of increasing competition from the 
civilian sector.   
On the other hand, the service member (recruit) is better informed than the Air 
Force about their personal preferences, willingness to re-enlist (enlist), and ability; 
information that cannot be observed by the Air Force but is vital in cost-effectively 
retaining quality service members.   
According to The Tenth Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC) 
(2008), DoD used signaling theory in FY 2007 to address hidden characteristic issues in 
recruiting. DoD’s goal was to recruit high quality service members “that can be trained 
for increasingly complex and high-technology-based tasks” (p. 27).  Two measurements 
were used to signal quality:  educational achievement, the proportion of those who 
obtained High School diplomas, and training aptitude, the scores recruits received on the 
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). 
DoD found that recruits who graduated from high school verses obtaining a 
General Educational Development (GED) certificate or not graduating have a higher 
probability of completing their first term of enlistment.  Additionally, those recruits who 
scored at the 50th percentile or higher (Categories I–IIIA) on the AFQT tend to learn 
more quickly and effectively in training and subsequently perform better on the job.  




percent of new recruits should have high school diplomas, and 60 percent should score in 
Categories I–IIIA on the qualification test; the highest quality recruits have a combination 
of both measurements.   
Based on the QRMC, the DoD views recruiting quality service members as a 
challenge now and in the future, with continued focus on labor market conditions, 
youths’ viewpoint toward current military operations, veterans’ opinions, higher 
educational opportunities, and competition with labor market compensation as a means to 
determine potential recruits’ signals.   
This confirms that DoD recognizes the importance of higher standards when 
enlisting members to critical AFSCs.  Is that enough effort for DoD to answer the 
question regarding recruiting the right quality and quantity of service members? Or is an 
alternative mechanism needed to further improve the quality of service members 
recruited? Further research may be needed to fully answer those questions.   
Regarding retention, service members can only signal their intent to re-enlist by 
either accepting the re-enlistment or separating from the military under the current 
Optimization model.  Their decision is based purely on the amount the Air Force offers to 
pay for their labor and their perceived reservation price, or willingness to accept that 
payment. On the other hand, the Air Force does not have the capability to choose who to 
retain based on its preferences between higher and lower quality service members or to 
pay service members different SRBs based on their willingness to accept.   
The Air Force can use a similar approach as in recruiting, but the basic standards 
or factors used to determine quality, a high school diploma and/or AFQT scores, at this 
point have already been met.  Additionally, using traditional auction theory as a force-
shaping tool can ensure a more precise targeting of the required Air Force end strength; 
however, traditional auctions do not fully minimize costs.  In particular, traditional 
auctions avoid the undesired results the Air Force faces when the SRB is set too high or 
too low; but they involve potentially significant income transfers from the Air Force to 
the service members.   
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VI. EVALUATIONS OF ALTERNATIVE AUCTION 
MECHANISMS 
A. INITIAL PROPOSED MECHANISM 
To allow information to become more symmetrical and cost efficient, this 
research initially developed a two-stage separating auction mechanism incorporating both 
auction and signaling theory (Appendix).  The mechanism was set up like a independent 
private-valued reverse second price sealed bid auction where the military is the one buyer 
or bid-taker for labor services and eligible service members are the many sellers or 
bidders (of labor services). 
The first auction sets the SRB level to meet the Air Force’s overall re-enlistment 
goals, as in Figure 3; the second stage determines a lower SRB amount offered to service 
members willing to re-enlist at a lower price but with the guarantee of a longer service 
commitment contract.  The intent is to capture those members more willing to re-enlist, 
either service members with a strong preference for military service, or service members 
with high military specific skills/lower general skills who possess less attractive civilian 
opportunities; these categories of service members should be willing to forgo some SRB 
payout to ensure they are employed for a longer period of time.  As stated earlier, those 
service members who do not meet the basic performance requirements are separated and 




Figure 6.   Initially Proposed Mechanism 
The outcome of the two-stage separating auction mechanism shows the Air 
Force’s cost (dot shaded area in Figure 6) to be significantly lower, more cost-effective, 
than the current SRB retention model and traditional auctions (the cost savings are the 
solid shaded area in Figure 6).  Unfortunately, this mechanism only retains those lower 
cost service members, not necessarily the higher quality service members the Air Force 
may desire.   
Experiments reported by Cook (2008) show that actual bidding behavior 
corresponds closely to the theoretically predicted behavior.  These experiments were 
conducted using both enlisted Marines at the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, 
CA and military officers at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA.  Bidders 
truthfully reveal their opportunity costs in the first round second-price sealed-bid auction.  
Projected savings from the second round auctions approaches 25–30 percent in these 
experiments. 
SRB 




Sorting Equilibrium SRB 
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What if the Air Force was able to discriminate between higher and lower quality 
service members, pay lower bonuses for lower quality members and larger bonuses 
(possibly beyond the current Required SRB) for higher valued members?   
B.  ALTERNATIVE AUCTION MECHANISMS  
Many salary determination studies for the Navy’s retention and assignment 
processes have been done using alternative auction mechanisms.  The research tailored 
those mechanisms towards finding the answer to the service member quality question 
above; how to capture the Navy’s valuation of sailors and adjust compensation, both 
monetary and non-monetary, accordingly.  This section introduces the findings of those 
studies and begins the research on the potential success if the Air Force aligned the 
current retention mechanism towards the results of the Navy’s retention and assignment 
processes.   
1.  Preferences: Two-Sided Mechanisms 
One of the key ingredients the current retention mechanism lacks is the ability for 
the Air Force to express its preferences over the quality of sailors to retain.  Again, it has 
been determined that using auction mechanisms, particularly a Second Priced Sealed Bid 
Auction, can better assure the right quantity of sailors for those critical AFSCs and 
provide a more cost effective means of determining the required SRB payout for the 
targeted end strength.  This indication has proven that the current retention mechanism, 
traditional auctions, and the initial proposed mechanism are all one-sided mechanisms, 
meaning that only the sailors have the ability to express their preferences on whether to 
re-enlist or separate based on the SRB offered.  
To introduce the importance of a two-sided mechanism, a former Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) student (Robards, 2001) recognized the need to obtain a 
better, more cost-effective preference-oriented assignment process for the Navy.  He 
explored the notion of a two-sided mechanism as a possible alternative means of 
assigning sailors to billets by examining the similarities and difference between a two-
sided matching process and the current Navy assignment process.  With various 
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modifications to the processes, his findings supported the notion that a two-sided 
mechanism is not only cost effective, but improved the overall quality of assignments.  
To further enhance the process, Robards suggested incentives such as monthly cash 
payment, additional annual leave, or promotion and assignment points to encourage 
sailors to fill critical hard to fill positions (p. 52). 
In Robards’ model, sailors seeking jobs submit their rank-ordered preference list 
for the jobs available; the commands with open billets similarly submit their rank-ordered 
preference list for the available sailors (possibly automatically generated according to the 
sailors’ characteristics and the command’s preferences over those characteristics).  These 
lists are inputs to a matching algorithm that develops stable matches.  Stable matches 
require that the sailor and the command must both prefer their current match than any 
other match they can individually negotiate (i.e., the sailor and the command cannot both 
find a preferred alternative to the current match).  The matching algorithm can favor the 
sailors’ preferences (the sailor-optimal model) or the commands’ preferences (the billet-
optimal model). 
To further define this research, a second student (Tan, 2006) reiterated the 
benefits of using a two-sided auction mechanism, identified the two complications of 
using an assignment auction affecting the incentive of bidders to submit their truthful 
valuation of billets, and simulated an alternate auction mechanism that combined both 
auction and matching theories to capture those benefits of a two sided auction while 
solving the two complications of bidder truthfulness.   
Tan’s model incorporated money into the matching solution.  In particular, sailors 
specify their required SRB (willingness to accept) for each billet in which they are 
interested.  Lower SRBs reflect billets the sailor is more willing to accept; the required 
SRB can be zero.  Similarly, commands express the SRB they are willing to pay for each 
available sailor; higher SRBs are associated with more desirable sailors.  The matching 
algorithm then either maximizes the sailors’ aggregate total surplus or the commands’ 
aggregate total surplus, adjusting SRBs for oversubscribed billets or over demanded 
sailors, until each sailor is assigned to one billet and each billet receives no more than one 
sailor.  Again, this process results in stable matches between sailors and commands. 
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2. Proposed Models  
Using the concept of two-sided mechanisms, Robards (2001) concluded that a 
“Many-to-One” matching model, many sailors employed by one service, was the 
appropriate model for sailor assignments.  This model motivates the sailor-optimal and 
billet-optimal models for which Tan (2006) developed a simulation model to test the 
mechanism’s performance.  The following was discovered.   
a. Sailor-Optimal Model  
Under this model, the mechanism provides the sailors as a group with their 
best possible stable billet fit (maximizes aggregate sailor surplus).  This approach, as 
noted by Tan (2006), motivates sailors to submit their true valuation (minimum 
acceptable SRB) for each of the billets; the sailors’ dominant strategy is to state their true 
minimum willingness to accept for each acceptable billet.  The initial payout (incentive 
pay) is equal to the billet’s willingness to pay for that sailor, for all sailor/billet 
combinations, and decreases for over-subscribed billets until all billets are filled with no 
more than  one sailor.  This motivates sailors to bid truthfully to receive his preferred 
billet.  Sailors cannot benefit by inflating their willingness to accept values in the sailor-
optimal method.  Their SRB for their matched billet depends on the billet’s willingness to 
pay for that sailor; the sailor’s required SRB only determines the billet to which the sailor 
is matched.  Inflating a sailor’s willing to accept would not increase the SRB but may 
preclude a preferred match (Resare, 2007).  From the Navy’s perspective, the sailor-
optimal mechanism is not necessarily truth-revealing (commands can potentially benefit 
by misstating their willingness to pay), and it is more expensive than the billet-optimal 
model.   
b. Billet-Optimal Model  
The billet-optimal model provides billets as a group with the best possible 
sailor fit (maximizes aggregate billet surplus).  This mechanism is not necessarily truth 
revealing for sailors, but more cost effective and truth revealing for the Navy. Initial 
SRBs are set equal to the sailors’ willingness to accept instead of the billets’ willingness 
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to pay.  The SRB (incentive pay) increases for over-demanded sailors until a stable 
equilibrium is reached with each sailor matched to just one job and no more than one 
sailor assigned to each billet.  Under this model, sailors are less likely to be truth 
revealing and may overstate their bids to capture some of the Navy’s surplus.   
Tan’s simulation model results show that the Sailor-Optimal Model is 
more costly (the sailor has a higher surplus value than with the billet-optimal model), it is 
also likely to be more incentive-compatible and thereby more truth-revealing, for both 
sailors and billets, than the Billet-Optimal Model (p. 48).   
To retain the truth-revealing properties of a Sailor-optimal approach but 
shift the surplus back to the Navy, additional research is needed to modify the alternative 
auction mechanisms.   
C. APPLICATION TO THE AIR FORCE  
Initially, an experimental auction mechanism was created to combat the high-cost 
low-quality aspects of the current SRB optimization model.  The basic mechanism 
introduced a cost-efficient method that could successfully transfer income back to the Air 
Force through a two-staged separating auction, which incorporated both auction and 
signaling theories.  The results showed the Air Force’s costs significantly decreased by 
providing a lower SRB payout for those service members more willing to re-enlist 
(requiring a smaller SRB).  Unfortunately, this mechanism did not necessarily capture 
those higher quality service members preferred by the Air Force because it failed to 
distinguish across service members on the basis of service member quality (airmen more 
attractive to the Air Force).  Using what we know about the Navy’s potential approach 
for creating a better assignment process, the Air Force can take a similar approach to 
improve the quality of its retained service members.  One possibility that builds on the 
Robards’ and Tan’s research is to modify the simple second-price sealed-bid auction by 
discounting the SRB bids for higher quality service members by a predetermined amount 
(potentially related to their qualifications).  Service members would submit a bid for their 
required SRB and bidders would be ranked from lowest cost to highest cost; for higher 
quality sailors, the bids used in the ranking would be their actual bids minus their quality 
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adjusted discount.  Once the low-cost bidders are determined and the first excluded bid 
identified, retained service members would all receive the first excluded SRB as a base; 
higher quality service members would also be paid their quality adjustment.  This auction 
would retain the properties of the second-price sealed-bid auction described above, but 
provide a higher SRB to higher quality service members, increasing their retention 
probability. 
By identifying the right two-sided mechanism, service members will be given the 
opportunity to indicate their preferences to remain on active duty and signal their quality 
level through mediums such as performance reports, promotion/CDC testing results, 
physical fitness scores, etc.  In turn, the Air Force can indicate which AFSCs require 
certain qualities or qualifications and target more desirable service members to retrain 
into those identified AFSCs.   
Additionally, the resulting retention mechanisms, as with the Sailor-optimal 
model used above, could allow the Air Force to maintain truthful revelation properties 
enabling a more precise SRB payout for those higher quality service members.  
Unfortunately, this model is less cost effective, potentially costing the Air Force more to 
capture higher quality service member; the trade-off between cost and quality is an issue 
for future research.   
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VII. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has proven ways for the Air Force to shift its current retention 
mechanism into a two-sided alternate auction mechanism, extending beyond the 
traditional simple auctions and the two-stage mechanism proposed in the Appendix.  The 
discussion using draws on research conducted on the Navy’s assignment and retention 
research programs.  As proven in this research, along with research conducted by other 
NPS students, the Air Force’s current retention mechanism poses many challenges.  First, 
the current retention mechanism is one-sided; service members can express their 
preferences for re-enlistment by either re-enlisting or separating from active duty, but it 
ignores any Air Force preferences regarding the quality of the service member needed to 
fill critical AFSCs.  Second, the current model is not cost effective; it not only pays an 
equal amount to all service members, it cannot predict the precise SRB payout required to 
meet its end strength retention target.  Its design almost ensures payouts will be too high 
or too low, therefore further increasing costs to fix deficits or surpluses.  Lastly, the 
model is set to only capture the lowest-cost service members, not necessarily the higher 
quality personnel, by setting the retention goal at the SRB required to retain a specified 
number of service members regardless of quality.  These three challenges indicate that 
“fixes” to meet end strength targets may be more costly in the future.   
Using auctions verses traditional SRB retention methods provides a better 
solution to finding the right price for the right number of people.  Therefore, an initial 
mechanism, a two-staged separating auction which incorporated both auction and 
signaling theories, was introduced and shown to be a cost efficient means of setting the 
SRB at the right levels (two different prices were paid; one to retain service members for 
one year, or a shorter time period, and a lower price to guarantee retention for multiple 
years, or a longer time period).  However, this mechanism only addressed one of the two 
original existing problems; it better predicted the right quantity of people while reducing 
cost associated with those retained.  It was able to discriminate based on those service 
members willing to re-enlist for a lower SRB, but it failed to capture what the Air Force 
considers more valuable service members (the quality problem).  This mechanism was a 
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step in the right direction, using auction and signaling theories, but still lacked the ability 
to capture both sides of the labor market to improve the quality of re-enlisted service 
members.   
To combat this issue and further enhance the retention/assignment process, two-
sided mechanism theory was introduced.  The outcome created two additional models, 
which were tested to explore the trade-offs between cost and quality in service member 
retention.  This additional process allowed both sides of the labor market, the military 
commands and the service members, to express their preferences when determining sailor 
to billet/billet to sailor benefits.  Using the concepts from previous student theses that 
have addressed the Navy’s Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) process, the Air Force is now 
better equipped to enhance its own mechanisms and further exploit similar alternative 
two-sided auction mechanisms to capture the right price to retain the right quality of 
service members.   
In all, this thesis has shown the movement to a more cost-effective mechanism by 
building on the current mechanism, introducing auctions mechanisms, and creating an 
initial proposed alternative auction mechanism.  One major downfall to these 
mechanisms is their one-sided nature.  Continuing the movement but providing additional 
two-sided mechanisms will enable the Air Force to better utilize and reduce the overall 
retention budget and capture those highly qualified service members needed to fill critical 
AFSCs.   
 49












IF SALARY REQUEST IS ABOVE 90TH PERCENTILE OF THE DISTRIBUTION:
Distribution of Salary Requests to Firm A
The lowest  annual salary request submitted to Firm A by one of its other current employees was:
The highest  annual salary request submitted to Firm A by one of its other current employees was:
The 10th highest  annual salary request submitted to Firm A by one of its current employees was:
Your Employer, Salary, and Income for the Next 5 Years
Your salary request was among the 10 highest requests submitted to Firm A.
Therefore, you will not be retained by Firm A and will instead be employed by Firm B for the next 5 years.
Each year, you will receive the annual salary offered to you by Firm B previously.
Thus, your income over the next 5 years will be as follows:
Year 1:  
Year 2:  
Year 3:  
Year 4:  
Year 5:  
Total:
The total above is your experimental earnings for this period.
Please wait until instructed to do so before clicking on the button below.
This total will be converted to actual earnings from participation in this experiment at the exchange rate of
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IF SALARY REQUEST IS BELOW 90TH PERCENTILE OF THE DISTRIBUTION:
Distribution of Salary Requests to Firm A
The lowest  annual salary request submitted to Firm A by one of its other current employees was:
The highest  annual salary request submitted to Firm A by one of its other current employees was:
The 10th highest  annual salary request submitted to Firm A by one of its 100 current employees was:
Recall that this 10th highest salary request is the lowest request submitted among the 10 employees not retained.
Your Employer and Salary for the Next Year
Your salary request was not among the 25 highest requests submitted to Firm A.
Therefore, you will be retained by Firm A for the next year.
Your salary for this first year will be equal to the 25th highest salary request submitted to Firm A as given above.
Future Lay Offs at Firm A
Firm A will continue to reduce the size of its workforce in future years.
You estimate that Firm A will lay off the following percentage of its employees in each of the next 4 years: %
Employees laid off from Firm A in future years will be selected at random.
Thus, the percentage listed above is also the probability that you will be laid off from Firm A in any given year.
Conversely, the probability that you will be retained by Firm A in any future year is equal to: %
Your Employer in Future Years
Remember that if you are ever laid off from Firm A, you will be immediately employed by Firm B.
Each of these 5 patterns of employment and its associated probability is illustrated below:
Pattern 1 Pattern 2 Pattern 3 Pattern 4 Pattern 5
Firm A for 
1 Year
Firm A for 
2 Years
Firm A for 
3 Years
Firm A for 
4 Years
Firm A for 
5 Years
Probability of Pattern: % % % % %
Year 1 Employer Firm: A A A A A
Year 2 Employer Firm: B A A A A
Year 3 Employer Firm: B B A A A
Year 4 Employer Firm: B B B A A
Year 5 Employer Firm: B B B B A
Your Salary in Future Years
Each year that you are employed by Firm B, you will earn the annual salary previously offered to you by Firm B.
Thus, each of the 5 patterns of employment illustrated above has an associated pattern of annual salaries:
Pattern 1 Pattern 2 Pattern 3 Pattern 4 Pattern 5
Firm A for 
1 Year
Firm A for 
2 Years
Firm A for 
3 Years
Firm A for 
4 Years
Firm A for 
5 Years
Probability of Pattern: % % % % %
Year 1 Salary: $ $ $ $ $
Year 2 Salary: $ $ $ $ $
Year 3 Salary: $ $ $ $ $
Year 4 Salary: $ $ $ $ $
Year 5 Salary: $ $ $ $ $
Total 5 Year Income: $ $ $ $ $
Annual Average: $ $ $ $ $
Your Expected (or Weighted Average) Annual Salary
As shown above, your average annual salary over the next 5 years could end up being any one of 5 different amounts.
To determine the annual salary you can expect (on average) during this period, you must calculate a weighted average.
The weighted average salary is calculated using the following two steps:
In other words, your weighted average (or expected) annual salary is given by the following formula:
Weighted Average Annual Salary = Prob1 x Avg1 + Prob2 x Avg2 + Prob3 x Avg3 + Prob4 x Avg4 + Prob5 x Avg5
Using the values from the first and last rows of the previous chart, your expected average salary is thus: $0
(1) Multiply each of  the 5 possible annual average salaries by the probability of that particular pattern occuring.
(2) Sum these values over all 5 possible employment patterns.
While you are certain to work for Firm A for at least the next year, you actually have 5 different possible
   patterns of employment over the next 5 years.
In particular, you could be laid off from Firm A after 1, 2, 3, or 4 years, or you could remain with Firm A for the entire








Possibility of a 5 Year Employment Guarantee with Firm A
As noted previously, your employment with Firm A (and the associated salary) is currently guaranteed only for 1 year.
Your employer (and thus, your salary) in later years is uncertain with each possibility analyzed mathematically above.
As an alternative to this uncertainty, Firm A will give a 5 year employment guarantee to half of its retained employees.
Another Salary Survey at Firm A
To determine which employees will be offered 5 year employment, Firm A will conduct another salary survey.
This second survey will be conducted among only those 90 employees retained after the first salary survey.
This second salary survey will determine:
(1) which of the 90 retained employees will be guaranteed employment with Firm A for the next 5 years;
(2) the annual salary that will be paid to each of these 5 year employees.
For the 45 employees not guaranteed 5 year employment, the terms of employment with Firm A will remain unchanged.
In your case this means that if you are not guaranteeed 5 year employment with Firm A:
(1) You will still be guaranteed employment with Firm A for at least 1 year.
(2) The probability that they will be laid off from Firm A in any year after the first is still equal to: %
(3) Your annual salary during any year that you are employed by Firm A will still be equal to: $
(4) If you ever laid off from Firm A, you will be employed by Firm B for the remainder of the 5 year period.
(5) Your annual salary during any year that you are employed by Firm B will still be equal to: $
Your Second Salary Request to Firm A
You must now decide what 5-year guaranteed annual salary to request from Firm A.
Remember that if your 5-year annual salary request is among the lowest 45 requests in this second survey:
(1) You are guaranteed to work for Firm A for 5 years.
(2) You will be paid the 45th highest 5-year annual salary requested in this second survey.
What 5-year guaranteed annual salary do you request from Firm A:
5-Year Annual Salary Request to Firm A: $
In particular, after collecting all the 5-year salary requests from its 90 retained employees, Firm A will give a 5 year
   guarantee of employment to the 45 employees who submitted the lowest  5-year annual salary requests.
Remember that if your request is among the highest 45 of the 90 salary requests submitted, you will be laid off from
   Firm A and will work for Firm B for the next 5 years at the salary offer above.
If your salary request to Firm A is not among the 45 lowest, you will receive the previously determined annual salary for
   as long as you work for Firm A, but you will only be guaranteed employment at Firm A for the first year.
The 45 employees given a 5 year guarantee of employment will each be paid the lowest 5-year annual salary that was
   requested among the 45 employees not given a 5 year employment guarantee.
In other words, the 45 employees given a 5 year guarantee of employment will each be paid the 45th highest  5-year
   annual salary request that was submitted in the second salary survey.
Firm A will then determine the minimum 5-year annual salary necessary for 45 of its 90 retained employees to
  voluntarily remain with Firm A for 5 years.
The remaining 45 employees (those who submit the highest 5-year annual salary requests) will not receive a
   5 year guarantee of employment.
In this second survey, Firm A is asking each of its 90 retained employees to specify the minimum annual  salary that












IF SECOND SALARY REQUEST IS ABOVE 50TH PERCENTILE OF THE NEW DISTRIBUTION:
Distribution of New Salary Requests to Firm A
The lowest  5-year annual salary request submitted among the other Firm A employees was:  
The highest  5-year annual salary request submitted among the other Firm A employees was:  
The 45th highest  5-year annual salary request submitted among all Firm A employees was:  
Your Terms of Employment for the Next 5 Years
Your salary request was among the 45 highest requests submitted to Firm A.
Therefore, you will not be given  a 5 year guarantee of employment with Firm A..
Instead, you are only guaranteed to work for Firm A for one year.
At the end of each year with Firm A, the probability that you are laid off from Firm A is equal to: %
If you are ever laid off from Firm A, you will work for Firm B for the remainder of the 5 year period.
Each year that you work for Firm A, your annual salary will be:  $
Each year that you work for Firm B, your annual salary will be: $
Your Actual Employer, Salary, and Income for the Next 5 Years
Your actual employer in each of the next 5 years is as follows:
Year 1: Firm A
Year 2: Firm A
Year 3: Firm B
Year 4: Firm B
Year 5: Firm B
Thus, your annual salary and total income over the next 5 years is as follows:
Year 1:  $





The total above is your experimental earnings for this period.
Please wait until instructed to do so before clicking on the button below.
In this section, your employer and salary for each of the next 5 years is determined based on the probability of
   being laid off from Firm A each year.















IF SALARY REQUEST IS BELOW 50TH PERCENTILE OF THE NEW DISTRIBUTION:
Distribution of New Salary Requests to Firm A
The lowest  5-year annual salary request submitted among the other Firm A employees was: $
The highest  5-year annual salary request submitted among the other Firm A employees was: $
The 45th highest  5-year annual salary request submitted among all Firm A employees was: $
Your Employer, Salary, and Income for the Next 5 Years
Your salary request was among the 45 lowest requests submitted to Firm A.
Therefore, you will be guaranteed employment with Firm A for the next 5 years.
Each year, you will receive the 45th highest annual salary requested in the second survey which is indicated above.







The total above is your experimental earnings for this period.
Please wait until instructed to do so before clicking on the button below.
This total will be converted to actual earnings from participation in this experiment at the exchange rate of
   $100,000 of experimental income = $1 of actual earnings
Proceed  
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